

ULA's Response to the Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights

September 4, 2025

Introduction

On [September 2, 2025](#), the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Office of the High Commissioner and the Secretary-General released a report titled "**Situation of Human Rights of Rohingya Muslims and Other Minorities in Myanmar.**" Although the OHCHR-Myanmar Team had contacted us to receive answers to interview questions, the ULA regrets that the report does not adequately include the facts, figures, statements, and responses to ensure a balanced representation.

The recent UN report significantly undermines the efforts of the ULA to foster trust and social cohesion among the diverse communities in Arakan. The report's underlying motive is to increase blame and allegations against the ULA/AA rather than to uncover the truth or promote the interests of the suffering communities in Arakan.

In light of upcoming conferences in New York (September) and Doha (December), it appears that UN reports have been influenced by self-serving interest groups, prioritizing narrow agendas over working towards a better future for all peoples in Arakan.

The neglect of our responses to the interview questions further diminishes our trust in the UN's reporting mechanism in Arakan, especially given the complex situation on the ground. We strongly urge key responsible persons and OCHR's Myanmar Team to seek more accountable and balanced reporting on Arakan.

The current situation in Arakan remains highly fragile, with increasing activities of Islamic militant groups along the border with Bangladesh. We are deeply concerned that the UN's reports, if not accurate and impartial, could inadvertently escalate tensions, fueling insecurity and instability in the region.

Section (A) - Responses to the False Allegations in the UN's Report

From paragraphs 36 to 53 in Chapter IV, titled "Human Rights Situation of Rohingya Muslims," the report includes several statements against the ULA/AA that are riddled with factual inaccuracies, biased accusations, and attempts to obscure the truth. The key issues we wish to highlight are as follows:

36. In northern Rakhine State, the Rohingya continued to suffer many human rights violations and abuses, some of which were reminiscent of the 2017 atrocities. Both the military and the Arakan Army reportedly carried out air and artillery strikes, resulting in the killing of civilians and the destruction of civilian objects, and killings, enforced disappearances, torture and ill-treatment, arbitrary deprivation of liberty and the damage and destruction, looting and occupation of civilian property, in addition to the forced recruitment of Rohingya. While conflict-related violence affecting the Rohingya has decreased in 2025, the Arakan Army has reportedly perpetrated numerous abuses and violations against the Rohingya with impunity. Conduct by Rohingya armed groups, including the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army, have heightened protection concerns and contributed to widespread fear and further displacement.

Reply:

The statements in the report are misleading and do not reflect realities on the ground. The claim that “the Arakan Army has reportedly perpetrated numerous abuses and violations against the Rohingya with impunity” is incorrect. The ULA has established strict codes of conduct prohibiting such abuses and has, on multiple occasions, taken disciplinary action against individual members to ensure accountability.

The report also overlooks the ULA’s concrete efforts to protect civilians of all communities. Muslims in Rakhine actively participate in local governance, the judiciary, and community policing under ULA administration, demonstrating our commitment to inclusion and social cohesion. Muslim juries decide on cases involving Muslim communities, ensuring fairness and respect for cultural practices.

Moreover, the ULA has consistently worked to improve the humanitarian situation for all communities across Rakhine. Our policies remain firmly guided by the principles of civilian protection and adherence to international humanitarian law. We also categorically deny conducting any military recruitment of Muslims.

These allegations are unbalanced, as they rely heavily on reports from a single community and fail to reflect the ULA's position, actions, and demonstrated commitment to protecting all civilians.

37. Pervasive restrictions and surveillance on communications imposed by both parties, including Internet shutdowns and the seizure of mobile phones, hampered deeper investigation into violations and abuses in Rakhine State. As a result, no verifiable figures or estimates of civilian casualties or displacement could be compiled during the reporting period. Claims were received of over 1,000 Rohingya that may have been killed and tens of thousands forced to flee their homes. Rohingya civilians, particularly, were caught between positions of the Arakan Army and of the military, whose forces had included deployments of Rohingya recruits since March 2024. That intentionally and necessarily exacerbated intercommunal tensions and fuelled further violence. Since 12 April 2024, the military have burned hundreds of ethnic Rakhine homes in Buthidaung town, including in Ward 6, and deployed conscripted Rohingya in those operations. As Rakhine-owned homes burned in Buthidaung, the Arakan Army burned surrounding Rohingya villages, with as many as 25 villages burned in the following weeks.¹⁵ In an incident still under investigation, on 15 April 2024 in Buthidaung, the offices and pharmacy of Médecins Sans Frontières were burned along with all medical stock, further depriving people of essential medical services after the closure of hospitals in Maungdaw and Buthidaung.¹⁶ The availability and accessibility of healthcare services continued to decline, with numerous reports received of preventable deaths of children and displaced persons due to the absence of basic services and assistance.

Reply:

The accusations in the report are too strong and fail to reflect the complex realities on the ground in Buthidaung during the fighting. These claims appear to rely heavily on accounts from certain Muslim groups while disregarding the ULA/AA's position and explanations. The situation in Buthidaung was highly complex, involving multiple actors, including the Myanmar military, Muslim conscripts recruited by the military, and the ARSA armed group. To single out the Arakan Army as the sole party responsible for the burning of civilian houses is both unfair and unjust without a proper, impartial investigations.

It is also concerning that such serious allegations are presented based primarily on unverified eyewitness statements and the analysis of an individual researcher, Nathan Ruser, whose commentary has consistently displayed bias against the AA. Satellite imagery and selective testimonies cannot, by themselves, verify perpetrators in such a complex conflict environment. The ULA/AA reiterates that it has issued clear statements during and after these events, explaining the circumstances, and remains committed to transparency, accountability, and the protection of civilians in line with international humanitarian law.

Regarding the incident of the burning of the MSF office, [our statement](#) on April 23, 2024, noted that these actions were committed by Muslim militant groups, including ARSA, RSO, and others, who controlled urban Buthidaung during the conflict.

38. Displacement reportedly increased significantly, with Rohingya leaving their homes ahead of clashes or because of targeted violence by the Arakan Army, whose fighters threatened or attacked those who refused to leave, leading to further casualties. According to the United Nations, 350,000 Rohingya in Rakhine State and Paletwa Township, Chin State, have been displaced since the resumption of conflict in November 2023,¹⁷ although the real number is believed to be significantly higher. Survivors have faced repeated displacement, moving from village to village, in a desperate search for safety. As humanitarian assistance has been severely limited, survivors have been left to rely exclusively on the support of other Rohingya families.

Reply:

There is no direct UN presence in Rakhine State, and no proper independent assessment has been carried out. Therefore, the claim that “350,000 Rohingya have been displaced since November 2023” cannot be verified and appears to be based on estimates rather than factual ground data. Such figures risk being inflated by reliance on narratives from sources that may not be impartial. According to ULA’s ground assessments, as of June 2025, approximately 600,000 people are internally displaced across Arakan, of which fewer than 20 percent are Muslims.

These figures are consistent with local monitoring and reflect the reality on the ground. It is concerning that the UN Human Rights Office continues to present serious accusations against the ULA primarily on the basis of unverified verbal accounts. Some of these accounts may originate from individuals under the influence or threat of militant groups operating in the region. A more balanced picture would also consider the situation in the refugee camps in Bangladesh, where armed group dynamics have contributed to insecurity and misinformation. The ULA reiterates its commitment to providing accurate ground data and calls on OHCHR to ensure that future reporting is based on verifiable, impartial evidence.

39. In an incident in Htan Shauk Khan village, Buthidaung Township, Rakhine State, on 2 May 2024, in which hundreds of civilian casualties were reported, multiple sources alleged that over 1,000 Rohingya villagers had fled in fear of possible clashes. Witnesses described having been stopped by Arakan Army elements, divided into three groups in paddy fields and fired upon, with the death of scores. One interviewee depicted the scene as “a river of blood. ... I saw shooting. I saw mass killing. It was a lot of guns, people were shot in the legs and chest”. Another survivor recounted the killing of 20 relatives, including 3 children.

Reply:

There are numerous local interviews and other evidence confirming that residents of Htan Shauk Khan have continued living under their village administrator from the time of the alleged incident until now. This demonstrates that the claims of a massacre are unfounded. It is concerning that the UN report appears to rely heavily on hearsay and unverified narrative accounts from individuals who crossed into Bangladesh, while neglecting to consider evidence from within the community itself. Such an approach raises serious questions about the accuracy and balance of the reporting. The ULA reiterates that no massacre occurred in Htan Shauk Khan. The reality on the ground was intense fighting between AA and junta forces, with the involvement of armed Muslim militants, not deliberate targeting of civilians. We urge that future reporting be based on verifiable, impartial investigations that include the voices of all affected communities.

In its press briefing on August 10, 2025, the ULA categorically denied these false allegations. Furthermore, the ULA invited independent national media outlets to visit and investigate the truth of the incident. In short, the stories mentioned in the UN’s report are fabricated and false. The so-called eyewitnesses and evidence are also lies, and some media [sources](#) have uncovered cases of fabricated eyewitnesses who are actually active ARSA members participating in the violence. In reality, there was no massacre in Htan Shauk Khan, as wrongly stated in the report, but only intense fighting between the AA and Myanmar junta forces collaborating with Muslim militants. For the full explanation, please [refer to the press briefing](#).

40. The situation deteriorated further with the Arakan Army's offensive to capture Buthidaung town on 17 May 2024 and Maungdaw town in mid-June 2024. In early May, tens of thousands of Rohingya took refuge in Buthidaung town, including in a school downtown reportedly sheltering over 10,000 civilians. On 6 May, artillery shelling reportedly carried out by the Arakan Army hit the school, killing 4 and wounding 15 others. Another attack struck the school on 17 May 2024, after the Arakan Army had captured the town and Rohingya areas, including in Wards 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 and 7, were torched. Interviewees described the burnings of people locked inside houses, summary executions, the targeting of fleeing civilians and disappearances. Rohingya from or displaced to Buthidaung tried to flee towards Maungdaw, but the Arakan Army prevented them from travelling farther. Victims described spending the night along the road with, reportedly, tens of thousands of people. Describing the fear and chaos of the situation, one interviewee stated: "Everyone was crying – father cannot find son, son cannot find father, husband and wife separated, children cannot find their parents. People were crying for the whole night." In the morning, the Arakan Army forced displaced Rohingya to travel to villages under their control, with accounts of civilians walking all day in searing heat carrying small children and through villages razed to the ground. OHCHR documented killings, arrests, beatings, disappearances, extortion and looting as regular occurrences during that period.

Reply:

In the above paragraph, the UN's report mentions two incidents on May 6 and May 17 during the battle of Buthidaung. The report oversimplifies the complex situation on the ground to shift blame solely toward the AA, diminishing the responsibility and crimes of the Myanmar junta and Muslim militant groups. Unfounded allegations, such as the AA's artillery shelling of a school, are incorrect and lack tangible evidence. Furthermore, the ULA objects to the accusation of burning down houses. Rather, this occurred due to intense armed clashes compounded by prolonged junta aerial attacks on the towns. A full account of these incidents can be found in [our statement](#) dated May 20, 2024. A report from a UN organization should not rely solely on hearsay and unverified claims to accuse an armed resistance group like ours. We demand an explanation for these baseless accusations.

41. In the weeks following the burning of the Rohingya areas of Buthidaung, clashes intensified in Maungdaw Township, killing numerous Rohingya. On 10 June 2024, in Pan Taw Pyin village, an attack by a military helicopter killed at least eight Rohingya, while in Thi Ho Kyun village, a drone attack – that interviewees attributed to the Arakan Army – killed six. Local sources reported that the military had taken up positions in civilian homes, schools, mosques and madrasas and that the subsequent clashes had resulted in numerous Rohingya deaths and property damage. Using drones, the Arakan Army had reportedly killed dozens of Rohingya who had not left their villages. In the morning of 13 July 2024, in Habi Anarwa village, the military carried out an air strike on a Rohingya house, killing eight, including two women and two children. Clashes continued in the surrounding cluster of villages until 24 July 2024, endangering the civilian population, causing a reportedly high number of casualties and extensive destruction and prompting civilians to flee.

Reply:

The UN report once again makes serious allegations against the AA based solely on unverified testimonies, drawing conclusions without credible investigation. Attributing a “drone attack” to the AA on the basis of anonymous interviews is highly speculative. It should be noted that the Myanmar military possesses and actively employs advanced drone technology, whereas the AA’s drone capabilities remain limited and not comparable. To attribute these alleged attacks to the AA is both inaccurate and misleading. The ULA/AA categorically denies conducting any drone strikes resulting in civilian casualties.

42. Such escalation culminated in the reported killing of several hundred Rohingya in Maungdaw at the beginning of August 2024. On 4 August, in Maung Ni ward in southern Maungdaw town, the Arakan Army took over positions abandoned by the military and started killing and wounding scores of civilians through executions and artillery fire. Interviewees stated that, in one incident in Maung Ni village, Arakan Army elements had entered the house of an imam, where eight families, up to 36 people, including 10 women and 18 children, were sheltering. The 36 individuals have not been seen since and their fates are unknown.

Reply:

We object to the allegation regarding the Maung Ni village ward incident. The UN’s report should provide more tangible proof and evidence to support this accusation. According to our records, we found no evidence of our members being involved in such an incident in Maung Ni village on the specified date. Our statement on [August 7, 2024](#), clearly outlined rules and procedures for civilian protection in line with international humanitarian law during the Maungdaw battle. Thus, the claims regarding Maungdaw town are attributable to crimes committed

by the Myanmar junta and Muslim militant groups, and the UN's report unjustly shifts blame to us based on unfounded claims.

43. Multiple sources provided consistent testimony of the events of 5 August 2024 in Maungdaw town, when thousands of Rohingya gathered along the Naf riverbank to the west of the town, hoping to flee the fighting by crossing into Bangladesh. Drone and artillery strikes starting in the late afternoon had resulted in the deaths of possibly hundreds of Rohingya civilians. As one interviewee explained: "those on the way, they were stuck. Those in the village were stuck. And those on the riverbank were also stuck. There were 10,000 to 12,000 people on the riverbank at that time. Many died there. From the place where we were hiding, we could see dead bodies everywhere." One survivor stated that the boat in which they had been travelling towards Bangladesh had come under drone attack. Forty-six civilians, including three children, had been killed. While the Arakan Army blamed

"extremist Muslim armed groups",¹⁸ multiple interviewees attributed responsibility to the Arakan Army, stating that attacking drones had come from areas under the Arakan Army's control, where the military was not present. Drone attacks on fleeing civilians continued on 6 August 2024. One interviewee described having been on a boat with 50 people when it was hit, killing 38 people, including 4 children.

Reply:

Regarding the well-known incident near Maungdaw town, the ULA released a systematically [analyzed report](#) on August 17, 2025. The report clearly determined that various accounts of the incident differ significantly, relying on hearsay and unverified eyewitness statements. Moreover, some survivors of the incident have stated that it is unacceptable to accuse the AA without concrete evidence. Their statements suggest that allegations against the AA by certain members of the Muslim community are based on speculation, hasty conclusions, and political motives. Please refer to the full report for more information.

Additionally, regarding the incident on August 6, 2024, there is no evidence that it resulted from drone attacks by the AA. Instead, [credible video](#) evidence implicates ARSA and RSO in these atrocities, with the groups shifting blame onto each other. The incident primarily resulted from a boat wreck in the middle of the Naf River during the monsoon season, particularly when the Bangladesh Coast Guard (BCG) prevented the boat from reaching the shore.

44. After months of atrocities and suffering, the conflict dynamics shifted south and east, leading to a comparative decrease in violence affecting the Rohingya. By May 2025, the military's control had dwindled to Sittwe and Kyaukpyu, while Rohingya remained exposed to myriad abuses and violations. In an incident on 20 December 2024, three boys between the ages of 13 and 16 went missing while returning from fishing in Kya Kaung Taung, Maungdaw Township, an area under the Arakan Army's control. Their remains, identified by their clothes, were found two months later. Hopes that the situation of the Rohingya would improve under the Arakan Army as the new duty bearer were shattered, as violence and abuses against Rohingya civilians continued routinely, including through widespread arrests under the pretext of searching for alleged members of Rohingya armed groups. While in April and May 2025, sources reported initial returns of the displaced to certain areas of origin, the majority of Rohingya remained displaced, with estimates indicating at least 80,000 in northern Rakhine State. On 26 April 2025, 18 families who had left Bangladesh to return to Maungdaw were arrested upon their arrival in their village by the Arakan Army. As of May 2025, they remained detained in Maungdaw. That and similar accounts have contributed to increased levels of fear among displaced Rohingya and are likely to have deterred other families from returning from Bangladesh.

Reply:

The ULA was unaware of the alleged incident of December 20, 2024, and no such case has been verified on the ground. It is therefore surprising that the UN report attempts to attribute sole responsibility to the ULA, disregarding available evidence and alternative sources of information. The assertion that violence and abuses have increased in areas under ULA administration is also misleading and unfounded.

Human rights reporting should be based strictly on verified facts and impartial assessments, not on uncorroborated testimonies or speculative narratives. Once again, we reiterate that the ULA/AA is bound by its commitment to protect and provide for all people, regardless of background.

Despite extremely difficult circumstances, we have consistently strived to promote peace, accountability, and social cohesion. In fact, many displaced people have already returned to their villages under ULA administration, reflecting confidence in our governance. The claim that 18 families who returned from Bangladesh in April 2025 were arrested by the ULA is factually inaccurate. Instead, some media outlets reported [the resettlement](#) of newly returned Muslim families in Maungdaw on August 26, 2025. Therefore, such allegations misrepresent the reality on the ground and undermine ongoing efforts to stabilize and support communities.

47. Although the Arakan Army unequivocally stated to OHCHR that “the AA has never forcibly recruited anyone in Arakan”, credible reports of forced recruitment were received from camps in Sittwe in December 2024 and from Buthidaung, Maungdaw, Pauktaw, Kyauktaw, Mrauk-U, Minbya and Myebon during the reporting period. Newly arrived Rohingya in Bangladesh cited forced recruitment as a key reason for their decision to flee. Arakan Army fighters reportedly subjected Rohingya villages to recruitment quotas and interviewees expressed fears that non-compliance could lead to punishment, including displacement. Arbitrary deprivation of liberty and the use of torture and ill-treatment in the forced recruitment process, justified by allegations of links with Rohingya armed groups, were repeatedly reported. Survivors described harrowing experiences of torture and ill-treatment in Arakan Army custody, including in Buthidaung prison, ranging from beatings, the burning of body parts and mutilations to forced labour. In several cases, relatives of those deprived of liberty received no information on the fate and whereabouts of detainees.

Reply:

The paragraph misrepresents both the situation on the ground and the ULA/AA’s prior responses. There is no direct UN presence in much of Rakhine, and the report appears to rely primarily on uncorroborated testimonies from individuals who crossed into Bangladesh, without balanced, on-the-ground verification in the affected communities.

On recruitment:

- The AA has never forcibly recruited anyone in Arakan. AA members are volunteers.
- Claims of “recruitment quotas” or pressure on Muslim communities are incorrect.
- Our inclusive governance—involving Muslims in local administration, policing, and the judiciary—may have been misinterpreted as “forced recruitment.” To be explicit: the AA does not recruit Muslims by force, and such practices are prohibited by our codes.

On law, custody, and accountability:

- The ULA has standardized rules and procedures for policing, detention, and justice, aligned with international norms and adapted to local conditions.
- Ill-treatment and torture are forbidden. In the rare event of misconduct or custodial deaths, disciplinary measures are taken against responsible individuals.

- Our overarching policy is civilian protection and adherence to international humanitarian law for all communities, including Muslims.

On methodology and accuracy:

- Serious assertions—such as forced recruitment, torture, or mutilation—require verifiable, impartial investigation, not inference from single-source testimonies or secondary commentary.
- We urge that future reporting incorporate local interviews across communities, administrative records, and site checks, and reflect the ULA's submitted responses in full. The ULA/AA remains committed to peace, accountability, and social cohesion under extremely difficult conditions, and continues efforts to meet humanitarian needs and enable safe returns where possible.

In the above paragraph, we are disappointed to see that the UN's report misrepresented our responses. We are very surprised that the UN organization has engaged in such mischaracterization, which undermines our trust and hampers further collaboration.

For transparency, we will provide the full responses we previously shared in the recent interviews regarding this issue:

"The AA has never forcibly recruited anyone in Arakan. Our members are all voluntary participants driven by the political motivations and aspirations of the region. Some may misinterpret our inclusive efforts to involve all communities in the police and administrative systems as 'forced recruitment.' Like other nations facing national security threats, the AA may implement mandatory service policies based on the situation on the ground."

48. On 8 December 2024 in Ka Nyin Tan village, after the last battle before taking Maungdaw, the Arakan Army captured several soldiers and Rohingya recruits and reportedly burned them alive. Satellite images corroborated the presence of fire at the location as described.¹⁹ According to the interviewee, over 50 Rohingya hors de combat were subsequently moved to a nearby school, where they were reportedly beaten severely before being executed. Bodies were allegedly piled up and abandoned in a roadside drain nearby. No information is available about the fate of the soldiers.

Reply:

Unfounded accusations mentioned in the above paragraph are simply unacceptable, as no tangible evidence has been provided to support such serious claims. The so-called images referenced in the report do not clearly depict the incident or establish the truth. Instead, they appear to be mere speculation. We have urged the UN to provide concrete information regarding these cases, rather than vague or generalized details.

Furthermore, after the capture of Na-Kha-Kha (5) near Maungdaw, we issued a statement on [August 8, 2024](#), announcing the indefinite suspension of river transportation on the Naff River.

50. Although the Arakan Army stated to OHCHR that it “treats all communities equally under the same policy”, restrictions on the rights and freedoms of Rohingya imposed by previous Governments remained in place. Like the military, the Arakan Army persisted in denying the Rohingya identity by referring to them as “Bengalis” or “muslims”. OHCHR has documented continued restrictions on movements, including the imposition of night curfews, with a negative effect on religious practices, livelihood opportunities, such as limiting fishing licences and imposing exorbitant fees for letters of permission from administrators to leave villages, and communication, including through surveillance and the seizures of phones. Interviewees in northern Rakhine State said that Rohingya were only permitted to use vendor-owned phones to make calls, with the vendors required to provide recordings of calls to the Arakan Army.

Reply:

The claim that the ULA/AA restricts freedom of movement or livelihood opportunities for Muslims is inaccurate and misleading. Since the establishment of our administration, freedom of movement has been ensured and the ULA has actively encouraged all people—regardless of background or ethnicity—to pursue livelihoods and rebuild their communities in order to ease hardship.

The UN report also fails to acknowledge that numerous humanitarian organizations are already operating in northern Rakhine with ULA permission, providing essential support to local populations. These efforts demonstrate our commitment to both security and humanitarian access. It is concerning that OHCHR reporting continues to rely on unverified accounts that portray the ULA/AA as abusive, while overlooking the concrete steps we have taken to ensure community security, livelihood opportunities, and inclusive governance. We strongly urge that future reports be based on independent verification and direct engagement with communities on the ground, rather than on one-sided testimonies.

51. Those desperate conditions and the persistent state of fear and insecurity continued to compel Rohingya to attempt to flee abroad, often with tragic results. Hundreds of Rohingya, if not thousands, left Pauktaw and Kyauktaw in 2025, quite possibly trying to reach Malaysia or Thailand. On 12 February 2025, in Ye Township, Mon State, the military opened fire on a boat carrying Rohingya, killing six people. Their bodies were found ashore the following morning. Rohingya travelling on foot to Bangladesh are at risk of becoming victims of shootings, drone attacks, landmines, unexploded ordnance and trafficking in persons. Rohingya in Bangladesh reported having had to pay fees of up to 2.5 million kyats (approximately \$1,200) to Arakan Army personnel and to smugglers associated with them to flee. While United Nations figures estimate that 118,000 Rohingya have fled to Bangladesh since November 2023,²¹ local sources indicated that the numbers may be twice as high.

Reply:

It is not only Muslims who have suffered in Rakhine. Tens of thousands of Rakhine civilians have also faced torture, arbitrary arrests, forced recruitment by the Myanmar military, and restrictions on their freedom of movement in the Myanmar military controlled areas. The humanitarian crisis affects all communities in Arakan. Any report that portrays the situation as affecting only one group fails to capture the broader ground realities.

All communities, including Rakhine, Muslims and other minorities, are experiencing livelihood challenges due to the junta's blockade of trade and humanitarian aid. Some members of the Muslim community may attempt to flee abroad in search of better opportunities, as they have historically done, but these movements are voluntary and occur within community networks. We categorically reject the allegations that the AA/ULA has participated in human smuggling or forced people to flee.

It is also concerning that the UN report presents inconsistent and selective figures. In paragraph 38, it states that 350,000 Rohingya have been displaced since November 2023.

It is quite surprising to see inconsistent figures within a single UN report describing the same situation. For example, in the fourth sentence of paragraph (38), it states:

“According to the United Nations, **350,000 Rohingya** in Rakhine State and Paletwa Township, Chin State, have been displaced since the resumption of conflict in November 2023, although the real number is believed to be significantly higher.”

However, in the twelfth sentence of paragraph (44), it mentions:

“While in April and May 2025, sources reported initial returns of the displaced to certain areas of origin, the majority of Rohingya remained displaced, with estimates indicating at least 80,000 in northern Rakhine State.”

This raises the question: does the UN report imply that approximately 270,000 Muslims are displaced in central Arakan?

If so, such a claim is utterly baseless and illogical. The OHCHR-Myanmar team must thoroughly verify their data before publishing such claims, which appear to be based on incorrect information and numbers.

By portraying the crisis as if it affects only one community, the UN report not only overlooks the suffering of others but also undermines the credibility of local administrative authorities. Selective reporting disregards the hardships of Rakhine and other minorities, while unfairly diminishing the ULA/AA’s efforts to protect civilians and provide stability under extremely difficult conditions.

We strongly urge that future reports present a balanced and verifiable picture that includes the plight of all communities, rather than relying heavily on unverified testimonies from one side. This will help ensure credibility and reflect the complexity of the humanitarian situation in Rakhine.

Section (B) – What Was Not Mentioned in the UN’s Report

UN reports are generally regarded as neutral, unbiased, and systematic. However, in many cases like this one, the inclusion of fabricated facts, false narratives, and unfounded allegations renders the report one-sided and misleading. More importantly, while UN reports are expected to address the suffering of all victims across communities—such as Rakhine, Muslims, Mro, Thet, and others—in Arakan, what we observe instead is a tendency to amplify false narratives from one community while neglecting the suffering of others.

Responsible officials, including Mr. Volker Türk (High Commissioner for Human Rights) and his team in Myanmar, should be held accountable for these shortcomings. The current UN report contains four major errors regarding the human rights situation in Arakan:


First, as highlighted in Section (A), the report’s content concerning allegations against the AA is largely baseless, speculative, and lacking concrete evidence. It relies heavily on hearsay, unchecked eyewitness accounts, satellite images, and unverified photos. Despite this, the report makes serious allegations against the AA that are inconsistent with these unreliable sources.

Second, the report fails to include responses or statements from our side regarding these allegations, which indicates a lack of fairness and transparency—breaking the very ethics of balanced reporting. A responsible report should present claims from all sides; this omission constitutes a serious violation of impartiality.




Third: The UN’s report fails to mention the suffering of other communities in Arakan, particularly the Arakanese (Rakhine) people. According to our ground reports, between November 2023 and July 2025, the Myanmar junta has killed at least 925 civilians, injured 1,960, and arrested 956 individuals. Notably, approximately 70 percent of those affected are ethnic Rakhine (Arakanese) people. However, the UN’s report references only one incident in Byaing Phyu village among many others, neglecting the broader scope of violence and suffering.





Fourth, the report significantly overlooks human rights violations committed by Muslim militant groups such as ARSA, RSO, and others against all communities in the region, including Rakhine, Muslims, and minorities like the Mro. According to our reports, from November 2023 to July 2025, at least 34 civilians have been killed, six injured, and 24 arrested in the northern townships of Arakan. This omission indicates a biased portrayal of the conflict, failing to acknowledge threats posed by these militant groups against innocent civilians.



For clarity, the following map illustrates the affected areas and incidents.



The following table highlights some of the prominent atrocities committed by Muslim militant groups such as ARSA, RSO, and others.

No	Incidents	Photo Proofs
1	ARSA killed two innocent civilians on March 7, 2024, on Thae Chaung Road in Maungdaw.	  

2	ARSA brutally killed one civilian on April 4, 2024, in Sein Nhin Pyar village of Buthidaung.	
3	ARSA killed one villager in Pyin Hla Kuna of Buthidaung on April 15, 2024.	
4	On July 18, 2024, even Khamei individuals residing in the Gandhari IDP camps in Ward (4), Buthidaung were killed by ARSA.	
5	ARSA killed one villager named Kyaw Thar Awng, age 57 in Aung Zaya village of Maungdaw on December 3, 2024	

6	ARSA entered and killed on female villager and arrested another three in Shin-Swae-Ra of Maungdaw on December 4, 2024.	
7	On March 29, 2025, ARSA Terrorists Abducted and Killed four Khumei Men from Myawaddi village of Buthidaung.	

United League of Arakan

September 4, 2025